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Abstract
We consider the problem of secret key extraction
when n honest parties and an eavesdropper share cor-
related information. We present a family of probabil-
ity distributions and give the full characterization of
its distillation properties. This formalism allows us
to design a rich variety of cryptographic scenarios. In
particular, we provide examples of multipartite prob-
ability distributions containing non-distillable secret
correlations, also known as bound information.
1 Introduction
Many cryptographic applications nowadays are based
on computational security. In this type of proto-
cols, the security is based on two assumptions: (i)
the computational capabilities of an eavesdropper are
bounded and (ii) a conjecture on the computational
complexity of some mathematical problems. The ad-
vent of quantum computing however sheds doubts on
the medium-term applicability of these schemes. In-
deed, Shor’s algorithm [16] will allow an eavesdropper
provided with a quantum computer breaking many of
the now commonly used schemes, such as RSA.
There is a second type of security which is clearly
the strongest one: information-theoretic security.
This type of protocols are secure against attacks us-
ing unlimited resources, since the security is simply
guaranteed by known results of Information Theory.
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The first step in this direction was already given in
1949 by Shannon [15]: such a level of security could
only be attained by honest parties initially sharing
a secure secret key. An example of a completely se-
cure way of information encryption is given by the
one-time pad [18]: in this scheme the honest parties
share a private key. The message is summed (XOR)
bitwise with the common key and sent through the
insecure public channel. The receivers owning the
key can read the sent information performing a sec-
ond bitwise XOR, while no information on the mes-
sage is accessible to anybody with no access to the
key. It turns out however that (i) this protocol works
only when the parties willing to interchange the in-
formation share a private key of the same length as
the message to be encrypted and (ii) the key cannot
be reused. Moreover, the following question arises
in a natural way: how is the key generated? It was
later shown by Maurer that a secure key cannot be
generated from nothing [11]. More precisely, the hon-
est parties cannot establish a key by a protocol con-
sisting of local operations and public communication
(LOPC). Therefore, a necessary requirement for key-
agreement is that the honest parties share prior cor-
relations that are partially secret.
These pessimistic statements were somehow rela-
tivized in [11, 12], where it was proven that an arbi-
trary weak level of correlation and privacy can be in
some cases sufficient for generating a key. Further-
more, Quantum Cryptography protocols [2, 8] have
been shown to provide an efficient way for establish-
ing these initial partially secret correlations. Indeed,
it is a crucial problem in most of Quantum Cryp-
tography protocols how to transform into a perfect
secret key the noisy and partially secret data dis-
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tributed among the honest parties through quantum
channels. As said, this key will later be consumed
for sending private information by means of one-time
pad.
In this work, we study the inter-conversion among
different kinds of secret correlations in a multipartite
scenario, where n honest parties and an eavesdropper
have access to common information. More precisely,
each party, including the eavesdropper, has many re-
alizations of a random variable. These n+ 1 random
variables are correlated through a known probability
distribution. Since the secrecy content of these cor-
related data is non-increasing under LOPC, this set
of transformations is considered as a free resource.
That is, the honest parties are allowed to perform
any local operation on their data and to communi-
cate through a public, but authenticated, channel.
Given an initial probability distribution P , we focus
on two questions: (i) can P be generated by LOPC?
and (ii) can perfect secret bits be extracted from P
by LOPC?
A family of probability distributions is introduced,
allowing the construction of several examples (see be-
low) with a huge variety of distillation properties. In
particular, for each probability distribution we can
answer the previous two questions (i) and (ii). Note
that we do not consider the problem of how these cor-
relations are generated, that is, they will appear as
an initially given resource. However, there have been
proposed different ways of establishing partially se-
cret correlations, such as the satellite model by Mau-
rer [11], or Quantum Cryptography [2]. The ana-
lyzed techniques can be used to prove the existence
and activation of bound information, a cryptographic
analog of bound entanglement, first conjectured in
[9] (see also [7]). We finally discuss the connection of
these techniques with previous results on entangle-
ment transformations in Quantum Information The-
ory.
1.1 Examples
In this section we present some examples of multi-
partite secret correlations showing interesting distil-
lability properties. These probability distributions
are explicitly constructed in section 4.6. In the fol-
lowing examples, we consider n separated parties
{A1,A2, . . . ,An}. Throughout the article, whenever
we say that a subset of k parties are together, or form
a group, we mean that they can perform k-partite
joint secret operations. This can be done by meeting
at the same place, or by sharing a sufficiently large
k-partite secret key.
Example 1. n honest parties can distill a secret
key if at least 70% of them cooperate in the protocol,
independent of the fact that they join or not (the
choice of 70% is arbitrary).
Example 2. Probability distribution of n honest
parties where distillation is possible if, and only if, the
cooperating parties join in groups of at least k people,
independently of how many parties participate in the
distillation protocol.
The previous two examples can be considered as el-
ementary conditions on distillation. In the following
two examples we combine them with different logi-
cal clauses (AND and OR), in order to obtain more
sophisticated distillation scenarios.
Example 3. n honest parties can obtain a secret
key if, and only if, at least 70% of them cooperate in
the protocol, AND, they join in groups of at least k
people.
Example 4. n honest parties can generate a se-
cure key if, and only if, at least 70% of them cooper-
ate in the protocol, OR, the cooperating parties join
in groups of at least k people, or both.
In the previous examples all the parties played the
same role. In the following some specific parties have
a different status, that is, the possibility of distillation
may depend on their actions.
Example 5. Distribution of n honest parties
where distillation is possible if, and only if, the par-
ties AiAj participate in the protocol and remain to-
gether, independently of how many others cooperate
and how they distribute in groups. The same can be
done but imposing that parties AiAj must remain
separated.
It is now clear that one can design probability
distributions showing unlimited intricate distillation
properties.
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2 Bipartite secret correlations
In 1993, Maurer introduced the information-theoretic
key-agreement model, generalizing previous ideas by
Wyner [19] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3]. In his origi-
nal formulation, two honest parties (Alice and Bob)
are connected by an authenticated but otherwise inse-
cure classical communication channel. Additionally,
each party —including Eve— has access to correlated
information given by repeated realizations of the ran-
dom variables A, B and E (possessed by Alice, Bob
and Eve respectively), jointly distributed according
to P (A,B,E). From now on, we denote by the same
symbol, X , a random variable, X , as well as the value
it can take, x, e.g. P (X) = PX(x). The goal for Al-
ice and Bob is to obtain a common string of random
bits for which Eve has virtually no information, i.e.
a secret key. The maximal amount of secret key bits
that can be asymptotically extracted per realization
of (A,B) used, is called the secret-key rate, denoted
by S(A : B ‖ E) or S. More precisely, this quantity
is defined as the largest real number such that for all
ǫ > 0, one can find an integer N0 and a two-way com-
munication protocol for Alice and Bob transforming
N ≥ N0 realizations of A and B into random vari-
ables SA and SB satisfying
P [SA = SB = X ] > 1− ǫ
H(X) = log(|X |) ≥ (R− ǫ)N
I(X : CEN ) < ǫ, (1)
where X is another random variable and C denotes
the communication exchanged during the protocol.
Therefore, the secret-key rate quantifies the amount
of secret-key bits extractable from a probability dis-
tribution.
More recently, another measure for the secrecy
content of P (A,B,E), the so-called information of
formation Iform(A : B|E), has been introduced in
[14]. Intuitively, it can be understood as the mini-
mal number of secret-key bits asymptotically needed
to generate each independent realization of (A,B)
—distributed according to P (A,B)—, such that the
information about (A,B) contained in the messages
exchanged through the public channel, C, is at most
equal to the information in E. More precisely, Iform
is defined as the infimum over all numbers R ≥ 0
such that for all ǫ > 0 there exists an integer N , and
a protocol with communication C that, with proba-
bility 1− ǫ, allows Alice and Bob, knowing the same
random ⌈RN⌉-bit string X , to compute AN and BN
such that
P (AN , BN , C) =
∑
EN
[P (A,B,E)]
N
P (C|EN ), (2)
where P (C|EN ) defines a channel [14]. According to
this definition, we say that a probability distribution
P can be established by LOPC if, and only if, Iform =
0. Note that this statement does not mean that the
result of the corresponding LOPC formation protocol
is necessarily P , but it is a distribution P ′ at least as
good as P from Alice and Bob’s point of view. More
concretely, P ′ can be obtained from P by processing
Eve’s information, in the sense of Eq. (2).
Information of formation and secret-key rate are
two measures of the secrecy content of a probability
distribution with a clear operational meaning: Iform
quantifies the amount of secret-key bits required for
the formation of P (A,B,E), while S specifies the
amount of secret bits extractable from P (A,B,E).
A useful upper bound for S is given by the so-
called intrinsic information, introduced in [12]. This
quantity, denoted by I(A : B ↓ E) or more briefly I↓,
will play a significant role in the proof of our results.
The intrinsic information between A and B given E
is defined as:
I(A : B ↓ E) = min
E→E˜
I(A : B|E˜) , (3)
where the minimization runs over all possible stochas-
tic maps PE˜|E defining a new random variable E˜.
The quantity I(A : B|E) is the mutual information
between A and B conditioned on E. It can be written
as
I(A : B|E) = H(A,E)+H(B,E)−H(A,B,E)−H(E) ,
(4)
where H(X) is the Shannon entropy of the random
variable X . The intrinsic information also gives a
lower bound for the information of formation [14],
thus
S ≤ I↓ ≤ Iform . (5)
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3 Multipartite secret correla-
tions
The generalization of Maurer’s formulation to the
multipartite scenario is straightforward. Consider a
set of n honest parties Q = {A1,A2, . . .An} con-
nected by a broadcast public communication chan-
nel which is totally accessible to the eavesdropper
but which is tamper-proof. Each of the parties (in-
cluding Eve) has access to the correlated informa-
tion contained in many realizations of its correspond-
ing random variable. We denote by Ai the random
variable corresponding to party Ai. Eve’s random
variable is also denoted by E. In the whole paper
curly capital letters refer to parties and sets of par-
ties, while normal capital letters refer to random vari-
ables. In this scenario, general secret correlations are
represented by probability distributions of the form
P (A1, . . . , An, E). That is, all random variables in
each realization are correlated according to P , and
each realization is independent of the others.
One possible goal for the honest parties is to obtain
an n-partite secret key. Sometimes this is not possi-
ble, but still, a subset of m parties (with 1 < m < n)
can get an m-partite key. Therefore, there are many
different senses in which a distribution P is (or is
not) distillable. In order to get rid of such ambiguity
we choose the strongest definition of non-distillability.
We say that a distribution P is non-distillable if there
does not exist any pair of parties, capable of obtaining
a secret key by LOPC, even with the help of the oth-
ers. For similar reasons, in the multipartite scenario
there may be many ways of defining the secret-key
rate. But, in this paper we only use the secret-key
rate in bipartite situations, where the definition is
unique. In general, considering bipartite splittings of
the parties will prove to be a very useful tool for ob-
taining necessary conditions in the multipartite sce-
nario.
3.1 Bipartite splittings
We denote by P any subset of Q, and by P its com-
plement (the set of all elements in Q not belonging to
P). Each bipartition of Q can be specified by giving
one of the halves, say P .
The following two lemmas concerning any n-party
distribution refer to their distillation and formation
properties.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition for obtaining an
n-partite secret key is that: for all bipartitions P of
Q, when all parties within each half are together, a
bipartite secret key between P and P can be obtained.
Proof: Suppose the distribution can be distilled
into an n-partite secret key. The same must hold
when some of the parties are together. In particular,
a bipartite key between the groups P and P can be
obtained, for any P . Therefore, the last is a necessary
condition. 
Lemma 2: A necessary condition for the correla-
tions specified by P being generated by LOPC is that:
for all bipartitions P of Q, when all parties within
each half are together, the resulting bipartite distribu-
tion can be generated by LOPC.
Proof: Suppose the distribution can be generated
using LOPC by the n honest parties. The same must
hold when some of the parties are together, in partic-
ular, for the bipartite splitting P and P . Therefore,
the last is a necessary condition. 
4 A family of multipartite
probability distributions
In this section we present a family of probability dis-
tributions, denoted by PΩ, exhibiting a variety of dis-
tillation properties. The examples described in sec-
tion 1.1 are particular instances of this family.
4.1 Notation and definitions
From now on, we restrict the random variables of
the honest parties A1, . . . , An to take the values 0, 1.
Eve’s random variable E can however have a wider
range. In the remainder, unless explicitly mentioned,
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quantities between square brackets [s] are to be un-
derstood as (n− 1)-bit strings. That is, we associate
with each integer s ∈ {0, 1, . . .2n−1 − 1} the (n− 1)-
bit string corresponding to its binary expansion, and
denote this by [s]. We denote by [s¯] the string where
all bits have the opposite value than in [s]. As an
instance, suppose n − 1 = 3, we have that [2] = 010
and [2¯] = 101. We will use bit strings [s] to label the
outcome of the first (n − 1) variables A1, . . . , An−1;
for example A1 . . . An−1 = [s].
In what follows, we also use bit strings [s] to specify
bipartitions of the set of n parties Q. The subset
P[s] ⊂ Q is defined in this way: Ai ∈ P[s] if the i
th
bit of [s] is one. Notice that An always belongs to
P [s]. In this way, we associate with each (n − 1)-bit
string [s] a bipartition of Q. As an example suppose
Q = {A1, A2, A3}, the string 01 corresponds to the
bipartition (A2)−(A1A3), and, 00 corresponds to the
trivial bipartition ()− (A1A2A3).
Let us denote by PΩ(A1, . . . An, E) the following
family of probability distributions.
A1 . . . An−1 An E PΩ
[0] 0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
[0¯] 1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
[1] 0 [1] 0 Ω[1]
[1¯] 1 [1¯] 1 Ω[1]
...
...
...
...
[s] 0 [s] 0 Ω[s]
[s¯] 1 [s¯] 1 Ω[s]
...
...
...
...
[2n−1 − 1] 0 [2n−1 − 1] 0 Ω[2n−1−1]
[2n−1 − 1] 1 [2n−1 − 1] 1 Ω[2n−1−1]
In this table, each row corresponds to a different
event. For example, in the first row event, the
obtained outcomes are (A1 . . . An) = (0 . . . 0) and
E = “[0]0 or [0¯]1”, and this happens with probabil-
ity Ω[0]. As can be seen, the 2
n events are grouped
in equiprobable pairs. Notice that Eve always knows
the value of A1 . . . An, except in the first two events,
where she obtains the outcome “[0]0 or [0¯]1” indepen-
dently of which is the actual one. The parameters of
PΩ are the positive numbers Ω[0], . . . ,Ω[2n−1−1], only
constrained by the normalization condition:
2n−1−1∑
s=0
Ω[s] =
1
2
. (6)
A simple example of PΩ can be found in section 5.1.
4.2 Bipartitions
Let us study the bipartite properties of PΩ. In the
following lemmas, it is assumed that all parties within
each half, P[s] and P [s], are together.
Lemma 3: A bipartite secret key between the parts
P[s] and P [s] can be obtained if, and only if, Ω[s] <
Ω[0].
Proof: To prove the if statement we only have to
provide an explicit distillation protocol. This proto-
col has two steps. In the first step, the honest parties
discard all realizations of PΩ in which not all the vari-
ables within each half (P[s] and P [s]) have the same
value. This operation only filters the following events:
(A1 . . . An−1An) = [0]0, [0¯]1, [s]0, [s¯]1. (7)
The filtered probability distribution is, up to normal-
ization:
P[s] P [s] E PΩ|filtered
0 0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
1 1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
1 0 [s]0 Ω[s]
0 1 [s¯]1 Ω[s]
Where P[s] = Ai for all i such that Ai ∈ P[s], and
analogously for P [s] and P [s]. Notice that this is well-
defined because all parties in P[s](P [s]) have obtained
the same outcome. The second step is the repeated
code protocol, explained in the Appendix. There, it
is shown that this protocol generates a secret key if
Ω[0] > Ω[s], as we wanted to prove.
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The only if part can be proven by showing that the
intrinsic information of this partition is zero, I(P[s] :
P [s] ↓ E) = 0, when Ω[0] < Ω[s]. For doing so, we
perform the following stochastic map E → E˜: If E
is equal to [s] 0 or [s¯] 1, we assign E˜ := “[0]0 or [0¯]1”
with probability Ω[0]/Ω[s], and, with probability 1 −
Ω[0]/Ω[s] we assign E˜ := E. In the rest of the cases
we also assign E˜ := E. It is easy to check that I(P[s] :
P [s]|E˜) = 0, which ensures that I(P[s] : P [s] ↓ E) =
0. Now, the upper bound (5) implies that the secret-
key rate must be also zero. In other words, we have
that when Ω[0] < Ω[s]
S(P[s] : P [s]‖E) = 0, (8)
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 3 provides a tool for designing distribu-
tions with involved distillation properties. Suppose
that, in order to distill a secret key, the n parties
join in two groups according to the bipartition P[s].
Now, we can choose in which of these bipartitions
distillation will be possible, and in which not. We set
Ω[s] = 0, if we allow the parties to obtain a secret
key when arranged according to P[s]. Notice that for
non-trivial bipartitions [s] 6= [0]. We set Ω[s] = Ω[0],
if we forbid distillation when the parties are arranged
according to P[s]. Finally, we set Ω[0] such that the
normalization condition (6) is satisfied. Notice that
we have as many free parameters as there are possible
bipartitions.
4.3 Multipartitions
Lemma 3 tells us how to construct probability distri-
butions PΩ, choosing independently which bipartite
splits permit secret key extraction, and which do not.
Next, we generalize Lemma 3 by considering situa-
tions in which the n parties are joined in more than
two groups. Of course, this includes the case where
the n parties are all separated. Let us introduce some
notation first.
An m-partition of Q is given by m disjoint subsets
Q1, . . . ,Qm ⊂ Q such that Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ Qm = Q. As
before, we consider that the parties within each sub-
set Qi are together. We use Qi to denote the binary
variable associated with “party” Qi.
Lemma 4: Consider an m-partition of Q,
{Q1, . . . ,Qm}. An m-partite secret key among these
groups of parties can be obtained if, and only if, for
each bit string [s] such that its corresponding bipar-
tition P[s] does not split any set Q1, . . . ,Qm, the in-
equality Ω[s] < Ω[0] holds.
Proof: The only if assertion is just Lemma 1, but
using the equivalence of Lemma 3. Let us prove the
if part by giving a protocol which is a generalization
of the one given in the proof of Lemma 3. First, the
honest parties discard all realizations of PΩ in which
there is at least one subset Qi containing variables
with different values. Or equivalently, they reject
all events A1 . . . An = [s]0, [s¯]1 such that its asso-
ciated bipartition P[s] splits at least one subset Qi.
As usual, Qi = Ai for all i such that Ai ∈ Qi. After
this filtering operation the probability distribution is,
up to normalization:
Q1 . . . Qm E PΩ|filtered
[0]0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
[0¯]1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
...
...
...
[s]0 [s] 0 Ω[s]
[s¯]1 [s¯] 1 Ω[s¯]
...
...
...
Notice that in the first column, we specify the value
of them-bit stringQ1 . . .Qm with an n-bit string, say
[s]0. This is well defined if we recall that, in all fil-
tered events, the bits in [s]0 associated with the par-
ties belonging to Qi, have the same value, and this
value is the one assigned to the variable Qi. Now,
the m parties perform the repeated code protocol to
PΩ|filtered. In the Appendix it is shown that this pro-
tocol works if the condition of Lemma 4 holds. 
4.4 Non-cooperating parties
It is clear that a single party, say Ai, can always pre-
vent the others from obtaining a secret key. To do so,
she only has to make public the value of Ai in each
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realization of PΩ. After this procedure, Eve will know
the value of each variable in the two events where all
variables are equal: (A1 . . . An) = (0 . . . 0), (1 . . . 1).
In the rest of events, Eve already knew the value of
each variable. Therefore, by a non-cooperating party
we do not mean a party who is against the others, but
one that does not want to be involved in the distilla-
tion protocol. In this section, we generalize Lemma 4
by considering the presence of non-cooperating par-
ties. Let us first, introduce some notation.
In what follows, when referring to the m disjoint
subsets Q1, . . . ,Qm ⊂ Q, we do not demand that
they satisfy Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qm = Q. In other words, they
don’t have to be an m-partition of Q. It is under-
stood, that the parties not belonging to Q1∪· · ·∪Qm
do not participate in the protocol. Within all this sec-
tion, primed quantities between square brackets [z′]
have to be understood as (m−1)-bit strings. That is,
we associate with each integer z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2m−1−1}
the (m− 1)-bit string corresponding to its binary ex-
pansion, denoted by [z′]. As in the rest of the pa-
per, unprimed integers between square brackets mean
(n−1)-bit strings. We also denote by [z¯′] the (m−1)-
bit string where each bit has the opposite value than
in [z′]. Following the analogy, P[z′] is a subset of
{Q1, . . . ,Qm} defined with the same convention as
P[s]. That is, Qi belongs to P[z′] if the i
th bit of
[z′] has the value one. We define P¯[z′] analogously,
which always contains Qm. We also use P[z′] to de-
note bipartitions of {Q1, . . . ,Qm}. Additionally, we
associate with each bipartition of {Q1, . . . ,Qm} some
bipartitions of Q, in the following way. We say that
P[s] is associated with P[z′] if P[s] contains all parties
belonging to the subsets Qi such that Qi ∈ P[z′],
and, does not contain any party belonging to the
subsets Qi such that Qi ∈ P¯[z′]. Notice that the
non-cooperating parties, the ones not belonging to
Q1∪· · ·∪Qm, may or may not belong to P[s]. There-
fore, there can be many P[s] associated with one P[z′].
We also extend this relation to bit strings in a natural
way: we say [s] ∼ [z′] if P[s] is associated with P[z′].
Theorem 5: An m-partite secret key among the
groups of parties Q1, . . . ,Qm can be obtained if, and
only if, for each bipartition of these m groups P[z′],
the inequality
∑
∀[s]∼[z′]
Ω[s] < Ω[0] (9)
holds.
Proof: As in the previous cases, we prove the if
assertion by giving a protocol that works under the
stated conditions. The usual protocol is readily gen-
eralized to fit this case: The cooperating honest par-
ties discard all realizations of PΩ for which there is
at least one group Qi, in which not all the variables
are equal. Or equivalently, they reject all events
A1 . . . An = [s]0, [s¯]1 such that, its corresponding
bipartition P[s] splits at least one subset Qi. Notice
that in the filtered events, the non-cooperating par-
ties’ variables can have any value. After this filtering,
the probability distribution is, up to normalization:
Q1 . . .Qm−1 Qm E PΩ|filtered
[0′] 0 [0′]0 or [0¯′]1 Ω[0]
[0¯′] 1 [0′]0 or [0¯′]1 Ω[0]
[1′] 0 [1′] 0
∑
∀[s]∼[1′] Ω[s]
[1¯′] 1 [1¯′] 1
∑
∀[s]∼[1′] Ω[s]
...
...
...
...
[z′] 0 [z′] 0
∑
∀[s]∼[z′] Ω[s]
[z¯′] 1 [z¯′] 1
∑
∀[s]∼[z′] Ω[s]
...
...
...
...
As usual, Qi = Ai for all i such that Ai ∈ Qi.
As shown in the Appendix, the repeated code pro-
tocol works with PΩ|filtered if, for all [z
′], condition
(9) holds. To prove the only if part, let us suppose
that there exists at least one string [z′0] such that
(9) is not satisfied. According to Lemma 1, when the
groupsQ1, . . . ,Qm can distill anm-partite secret key,
a bipartite key is also obtainable when the m groups
are joined in just two groups. This must hold for any
7
bipartition of {Q1, . . .Qm}, say [z
′
0]. Let us see that
this is impossible when
∑
∀[s]∼[z′
0
]
Ω[s] ≥ Ω[0] (10)
holds. As in the proof of Lemma 3, we show
that the secret-key rate between P[z′
0
] and P¯[z′
0
] is
zero, by computing the intrinsic information between
these two parts. To do so, we perform a similar
stochastic map E → E˜: If E = [z′]0 or E =
[z¯′]1 we assign E˜ =“[0]0 or [0¯]1” with probability
Ω[0]/
∑
∀[s]∼[z′]Ω[s]. In the rest of the cases E˜ = E.
It is easy to check that
I(P[z′] : P [z′]|E˜) = 0 , (11)
which implies the above mentioned impossibility. 
4.5 Correlations without secrecy
In this section, we will characterize those PΩ that can
be established by LOPC. This is the content of the
following theorem.
Theorem 6: A probability distribution PΩ can be
generated by LOPC if, and only if, for all bipartite
splittings P[s],
Ω[s] ≥ Ω[0] (12)
holds.
Proof: Let us start by the only if part. In the
proof of Lemma 3 we have seen that whenever Ω[s] ≥
Ω[0], the intrinsic information for the corresponding
bipartite splitting is zero, I(P[s] : P [s] ↓ E) = 0. It
has been proven in [14] that I↓ = 0 if, and only if,
Iform = 0. This result and Lemma 2 imply that (12)
is a necessary condition for PΩ being generated by
LOPC.
For the if part of the proof, we proceed as fol-
lows. First, we introduce a probability distribution
P ′Ω and prove it cannot be less secret than PΩ. This is
done by showing that P ′Ω can be obtained from PΩ by
degradating Eve’s information; namely, there exists
a map for Eve’s random variable E → E˜ such that
PΩ → P
′
Ω. Next, we give an explicit LOPC proto-
col producing the probability distribution P ′Ω without
any additional resource. Thus, Iform is zero for P
′
Ω.
Then, it follows from the definition of information of
formation that PΩ has also Iform = 0.
With each PΩ such that (12) holds for all [s], we
associate the following distribution P ′Ω
A1 . . . An−1 An E˜ P
′
Ω
[0] 0 x Ω[0]
[0¯] 1 x Ω[0]
[1] 0 x Ω[0]
[1¯] 1 x Ω[0]
[1] 0 [1] 0 Ω[1] − Ω[0]
[1¯] 1 [1¯] 1 Ω[1] − Ω[0]
...
...
...
...
[s] 0 x Ω[0]
[s¯] 1 x Ω[0]
[s] 0 [s] 0 Ω[s] − Ω[0]
[s¯] 1 [s¯] 1 Ω[s] − Ω[0]
...
...
...
...
[2n−1 − 1] 0 x Ω[0]
[2n−1 − 1] 1 x Ω[0]
[2n−1 − 1] 0 [2n−1 − 1] 0 Ω[2n−1−1] − Ω[0]
[2n−1 − 1] 1 [2n−1 − 1] 1 Ω[2n−1−1] − Ω[0]
Actually, P ′Ω can be obtained from PΩ after the
following stochastic map on Eve’s random variable,
E → E˜. If E is equal to “[0]0 or [0¯]1” we assign
E˜ :=“x”. If E is equal to [s] 0 ([s¯] 1), we assign E˜ :=
“x” with probability Ω[0]/Ω[s], and, with probability
1−Ω[0]/Ω[s] we assign E˜ := E. Now, we prove that all
probability distributions P ′Ω of that kind can be cre-
ated with the following LOPC protocol. With proba-
bility 2nΩ[0] party A1 broadcasts the public message
“x” . After receiving “x”, each partyA1 . . .An locally
generates a random bit A1 . . . An. With probability
Ω[s] − Ω[0], party A1 broadcasts the public message
[s]0 ([s¯]1). After receiving this message each party
outputs its corresponding bit from the sequence [s]0
([s¯]1). This implies Iform = 0 for P
′
Ω, and the same
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result applies to PΩ. 
4.6 Construction of the examples
In this section we explicitly construct the examples
that have been introduced at the beginning of the
paper. This is done by repeatedly using Theorem 5.
Example 1. Let us design a probability distribu-
tion of n honest parties which is distillable if, and only
if, more than m parties cooperate in the protocol. In
other words, if n−m parties (or more) do not coop-
erate, distillation is impossible. Consider the situa-
tion where there are m cooperating parties. For each
bipartition of them, P[z′], there are 2
n−m different
ways of distributing the n−m non-cooperating par-
ties between the two groups. That is, there are 2n−m
different bipartitions P[s] associated with P[z′]. If we
set Ω[s] = Ω[0]/2
n−m for all [s] 6= [0], equation (9)
will be satisfied if, and only if, the sum
∑
∀[s]∼[z′]Ω[s]
has less than 2n−m terms, and this only happens if
the number of cooperating parties is larger than m.
Notice that Ω[0] is fixed by the normalization condi-
tion (6). Because all Ω[s] with [s] 6= [0] have the same
value, distillation is possible even when the cooper-
ating parties are all separated.
Example 2. Let us construct an n-party distri-
bution, which is distillable if, and only if, the co-
operating parties join in groups of at least k people,
independently of how many parties do not cooperate.
We denote by W[s] the number of ones that the bit
string [s] has. We impose Ω[s] = 0 for all strings with
k ≤ W[s] ≤ n − k, and Ω[s] = Ω[0] for the rest. As
before, Ω[0] is fixed by the normalization condition
(6). It is easy to see that, if there is a group of less
than k parties, the bipartition having these k parties
in one side and the rest in the other side, satisfies
Ω[s] = Ω[0], and this prevents condition (9) from be-
ing satisfied. When all cooperating groups contain at
least k people, all bipartitions that do not split any
of the groups satisfy Ω[s] = 0, in this case, condition
(9) holds independently of how many parties do not
cooperate.
Example 3. This n-party distribution is distill-
able if, and only if,, more than m parties participate
in the protocol, AND, they join in groups of at least
k people. This is achieved with the following assign-
ments. We set Ω[s] = Ω[0]/2
n−m if k ≤W[s] ≤ n− k,
and Ω[s] = Ω[0] otherwise. As in the example 2, if
there is one group of less than k cooperating parties
condition (9) does not hold. Reasoning in the same
fashion as in example 1, if there are m or less coop-
erating parties distillation is impossible.
Example 4. This n-party distribution is distill-
able if, and only if,, there are more than m cooper-
ating parties, OR, they joint in groups of at least k
people, or both. We set Ω[s] = 0 if k ≤W[s] ≤ n− k,
and Ω[s] = Ω[0]/2
n−m for the rest.
Example 5. This n-party distribution is distill-
able if, and only if, parties AiAj cooperate and re-
main always together. We suppose without loss of
generality that i, j 6= n. If the ith and jth bits of the
string [s] have the same value we set Ω[s] = 0, and
Ω[s] = Ω[0] otherwise. It is clear that this fulfils our
demand. A variation of this example is when distil-
lation is possible if, and only if, parties AiAj remain
separated. The construction of this case is closely
analogous to the previous one. Now, we set Ω[s] = 0
if [s] has different values for the ith and jth bits, and
Ω[s] = Ω[0] otherwise.
5 Bound information
Bound information represents the cryptographic ana-
log of bound entanglement, an intriguing feature of
some quantum states found by the Horodeckis in
1998 [10]. In the bipartite case, bound information
can easily be defined using the previously introduced
quantities [9]: a probability distribution P (A,B,E)
contains bound information when the following two
conditions hold:
S = 0
Iform > 0 . (13)
Therefore, P (A,B,E) has bound information when
(i) no secret-key bits can be extracted from it by
LOPC, but (ii) its formation by LOPC is impossible.
In other words, the non-zero secrecy content of the
probability is bound because secret correlations are
necessary for its preparation but cannot be distilled
into a pure form. There exist several results support-
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ing the existence of this analog of bound entangle-
ment in the bipartite case: in Refs. [7, 9] several
probability distributions were constructed for which
one can prove that I↓ is strictly positive but none
of the known secret-key distillation protocols allow
to extract secret bits. Moreover, it was shown in
[14] that there exist probability distribution where
S < Iform. This already proves the irreversibility,
in terms of secret bits, in the processes of forma-
tion and key distillation for some probability distri-
butions. Actually, the authors of [14] constructed a
family of probability distributions where Iform > 1/2
while S can be arbitrarily small. Unfortunately, no
example of P (A,B,E) such that 0 = S < Iform is
known until now.
Bound information was initially defined in the case
of two honest parties. However, its generalization to
the multipartite scenario is again straightforward: a
probability distribution P (A1, . . . , An, E) has bound
information when (i) its formation by LOPC is im-
possible and (ii) no secret-key bits can be extracted
between any pair of parties by LOPC. In what fol-
lows, we use the techniques described above in order
to show the existence of multipartite bound informa-
tion. We will do that for the case of three honest
parties. Moreover, we will see that similarly to what
happens in the quantum case, bound information can
be activated: the combination of different probabil-
ity distributions with bound information may give a
distillable probability distribution.
5.1 Proof of the existence of bound in-
formation
In this section we prove the existence of bound infor-
mation in the tripartite scenario. In order to do that
we give a probability distribution P (A1, A2, A3, E)
and show that its formation by LOPC is impossible
but no secret-key bits can be extracted from it by the
honest parties using LOPC. Although these results
already appear in [1], here we review them using the
formalism described in the previous section.
Using the introduced notation, an example of tri-
partite probability distribution having bound infor-
mation reads as follows:
A1A2 A3 E P1
[0] 0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 1/6
[0¯] 1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 1/6
[1] 0 [1]0 1/6
[1¯] 1 [1¯]1 1/6
[2] 0 [2]0 0
[2¯] 1 [2¯]1 0
[3] 0 [3]0 1/6
[3¯] 1 [3¯]1 1/6
Note that the role played by A2 and A3 in P1 is the
same, up to a relabelling of Eve’s variables.
Using Lemmas 1 and 3, it is relatively simple to see
that no pair of parties can distill secret bits from this
probability distribution. Consider, for instance, the
partition A2 − (A1A3), corresponding to [s] = [1] =
01. Because of Lemma 3, no distillation is possible
since Ω[1] = Ω[0] = 1/6. Then, Lemma 1 implies that
A2 can distill secret bits neither with A1 nor with
A3. Because of the symmetry of the distribution, the
same result holds for (A1A2)−A3. Therefore no pair
of parties can distill a secret key. Finally, consider
the third partition A1 − (A2A3). In this case, where
[s] = [2] = 10, we have Ω[2] = 0 < Ω[0] = 1/6.
That is, the probability distribution corresponding
to this partition is distillable, which means that it
could not have been created by LOPC. Using Lemma
2, this implies that the initial probability distribution
P1 cannot be created by LOPC either. This proves
that the non-zero secrecy content of P1 is bound, i.e.
it constitutes an example of bound information.
The proof presented here is almost the same as in
[1], having been adapted to the notation introduced
above. Actually, the non-distillability of P1 could al-
ternatively have been proven using Lemma 4. Note
also that many of the probability distributions given
above, such as Example 2, already constituted exam-
ples of bound information.
5.2 Bound information can be acti-
vated
The activation of bound entanglement is perhaps one
of the most surprising results found in entanglement
theory [5, 17]. Bound entanglement is said to be ac-
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tivated whenever one can distill pure-state entangle-
ment from the combination of several bound entan-
gled states. Remarkably, in some cases this activation
can be achieved by mixing different bound entangled
states [6]! As it will be shown shortly, a similar fea-
ture is observed for classical probability distributions.
Consider the situation where three honest parties
and an eavesdropper have access to correlated ran-
dom variables described by P1. In addition, they
also have access to other random variables described
by P2 and P3, where these two probability distribu-
tions correspond to cyclic permutations, A1 → A2 →
A3 → A1, of P1. Of course, P1, P2 and P3 have
bound information. Now, the three honest parties
forget what the actual distribution is. Alternatively,
one can think that a source is sending to the par-
ties random variables correlated through P1, P2 and
P3 with equal probability, and the information about
the prepared probability distribution is only accessi-
ble to Eve. The resulting distribution, Pres, can be
described as
A1A2 A3 E Pres
[0] 0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 1/6
[0¯] 1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 1/6
[1] 0 [1]0 1/9
[1¯] 1 [1¯]1 1/9
[2] 0 [2]0 1/9
[2¯] 1 [2¯]1 1/9
[3] 0 [3]0 1/9
[3¯] 1 [3¯]1 1/9
It is now straightforward to see that this probabil-
ity distribution is distillable, even in the fully multi-
partite scenario where the three parties remain sep-
arated. This follows from Lemma 4, since for all the
partitions one has 1/9 < 1/6. Therefore, the combi-
nation of non-distillable probability distributions pro-
duces a distillable distribution.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we have presented a family of proba-
bility distributions in the multipartite scenario of n
honest parties and an eavesdropper. Using this fam-
ily, we were able to construct different examples of
probability distribution with a huge variety of secrecy
properties. This rich variety of examples shows how
intricate the structure of multipartite secret correla-
tions is. Moreover, the introduced techniques allowed
us to prove the existence and activation of bound in-
formation, namely non-distillable secret correlations.
We would like to mention here some analogies be-
tween our results and the problem of entanglement
manipulations in Quantum Information Theory (see
Refs. [9, 4]). The intuition for the construction of
the previous family of probability distributions came
from the quantum states discussed in Refs. [5, 6]. In-
deed, these distributions represent the cryptographic
classical analog of these states. Moreover, the exis-
tence of bound information, that was our initial moti-
vation for this study, was conjectured in 2000 [9] as a
classical counterpart of bound entanglement. In this
sense, all these results constitute one of the first ex-
amples where well-established ideas in Quantum In-
formation Theory have successfully been translated
to the classical side. Up to now, the flow of results
has mainly been in the opposite direction.
Unfortunately, the existence of bipartite bound in-
formation, that is, probability distributions with non-
distillable secret correlations, remains as an open
question. Indeed, the existence of multipartite bound
information exploited the possibility of considering
splittings of the parties into different groups, some-
thing impossible in the bipartite scenario. In this
sense, it is an interesting issue to study how those
quantum concepts that allowed to prove the existence
of bound entanglement for quantum states, such as
partial transposition [13], can be adapted to the key-
agreement scenario.
Appendix: Repeated code pro-
tocol
In this appendix, the repeated code protocol is de-
scribed. Consider m separated parties A1, . . . ,Am
willing to generate an m-partite secret key. Each
of these parties, say Ai, has access to many re-
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alizations of its corresponding random variable Ai.
Additionally, there is an eavesdropping party, Eve,
who has access to a random variable E corre-
lated to Ai through the probability distribution
P (A1, . . . , Am, E). Note that it is assumed that each
realization of A1, A2, . . . , Am, E, is independent of
the other. Moreover, this probability distribution is
known by all the parties.
The first part of this key distillation protocol is
implemented by the following three steps:
1. Each party takes N realizations of her own ran-
dom variable:
AN1 =
(
A
(1)
1 , A
(2)
1 , . . . , A
(N)
1
)
...
ANm =
(
A(1)m , A
(2)
m , . . . , A
(N)
m
)
2. One of the honest parties —say A1— generates
locally a random bit k1, computes the N num-
bers Xr := (k1 + A
(r)
1 mod 2) for r = 1, . . . , N ,
and broadcasts through the public channel the
N -bit string:
(X1, X2, . . . , XN ) . (14)
3. All the remaining parties —in this case
A2, . . . ,An— perform the following operation.
Party Ai adds bitwise the broadcasted string
(14) to his symbols (A
(1)
i , A
(2)
i , . . . , A
(N)
i ). If he
obtains the same result for all of them, that is
(Xr + A
(r)
i mod 2) = ki for r = 1, . . . , N , he
accepts ki and communicates the acceptance to
the other parties. If not, all parties reject the N
realizations of PΩ.
The final step to attain a secret key uses as in-
put many realizations of (k1, . . . , km). It consists of
the one-way distillation protocol given by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner in [3]. The fact that this protocol is designed
for two parties is not a problem. In our case, one of
the honest parties, say A1, broadcasts all public mes-
sages to the rest, who perform error correction and
privacy amplification to their data.
Let us analyze under which conditions a probabil-
ity distribution belonging to the family PΩ can be
distilled into a secret key using this protocol. In the
usual notation, a probability distribution PΩ reads
A1 . . . , Am−1 Am E PΩ
[0] 0 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
[0¯] 1 [0]0 or [0¯]1 Ω[0]
...
...
...
...
[s] 0 [s] 0 Ω[s]
[s¯] 1 [s¯] 1 Ω[s]
...
...
...
...
Notice that when party Ai, with i ≥ 2, accepts ki
in step 3, the variables A
(1)
i , . . . , A
(N)
i are all equal,
or, all different to A
(1)
1 , . . . , A
(N)
1 . This is equivalent
to saying that, the N realizations of PΩ used in this
first part of the protocol, have to be all in the same
pair of events, characterized by a given s0, that is,
A
(r)
1 , . . . , A
(r)
m = [s0]0 or A
(r)
1 , . . . , A
(r)
m = [s¯0]1 for
r = 1, . . . , N . This happens with probability
p (s0) =
ΩN[s0]∑
[s] Ω
N
[s]
. (15)
Notice that in the case [s0] = [0], the bits k1, . . . , km
are all equal, and Eve has no knowledge about them.
If Ω[0] > Ω[s] for all [s] 6= [0], the probability p(0)
tends to one when making N large. Thus, choosing
a large enough N , the honest parties can obtain a
probability distribution that can be distilled to se-
cret key with non-zero rate by means of the one-way
reconciliation techniques of [3].
Result: An m-partite distribution of the family
PΩ can be distilled if Ω[0] > Ω[s] for all [s] 6= [0].
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